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1962/11/21

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General Taylor
(Return to Col. Legere for file)

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SECRET - EYES ONLY

21 November 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Daily White House Staff Meeting, 21 November 1962

1. Mr. Bundy presided throughout. DEFCONS no change.

2. The following matters arose:

a. It appears that Ralph Dungan may be the one who planted the story in the New York Times this morning concerning the potential availability and excellent qualifications of former Ambassador Bunker for the AID job.

b. There followed a considerable discussion on Cuba. Chuck Johnson, who usually does not command a very respectful hearing within this group since he is definitely non-New Frontier, said that he thought our present status on Cuba vis-a-vis the public was bad because it was a complex "middle" kind of status that is very hard for the great unwashed American public to understand. Somewhat surprisingly, Ralph Dungan supported him on this, which immediately increased Bundy's interest in the opinion. Dungan felt that the Secretary of State, or some equally appropriate candidate, should make a speech or issue a statement summing up the Cuban status in a considerably more detailed and explanatory manner than the President did on TV last evening. Bundy told Arthur Schlesinger that Ambassadors Stevenson and McCloy were eager to try to wrap this thing up somehow or other during the next few days, whereas Bundy felt that it was going to continue to require a lot of delicate orchestration for at least several more weeks. Bundy in effect admitted that we were unlikely to attain absolute fulfillment of the formal terms incorporated in the President's 27 October message to Khrushchev. He feels that we have got to sweat out the Soviet angles (missiles, technicians, etc.) over the next several weeks, and then, and only then, be prepared to address ourselves to Castro.

c. In continuation of the same discussion, Dungan said that he thought the Latin Americans were more confused than anyone at this point as to just what United States policy is supposed to be. Schlesinger

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contents of the declaration, and the U. S. draft declaration was poor.

Mr. Mikoyan proceeded to list the main points on which objections arose:

1. The US draft omitted or did not adequately reflect points raised in the exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.
2. It placed new conditions upon the promise of non-invasion, which had not been raised before.
3. It attempted to introduce the legalization of overflights of Cuba. To attempt to include such a provision into a document to be presented to the UN was impossible.
4. The draft ignored Soviet-Cuban proposals which--though not literally expressed in the exchange of letters between the President and Khrushchev--were implied in it.

Making the promise of non-invasion conditional upon actions of Cuba directed against the United States (or other areas in the Caribbean, Ambassador Zarin added) was a direct deviation from the understanding reached through the exchange of letters and rejection of obligations undertaken with respect to non-invasion.

The U.S. draft, Mr. Mikoyan continued, contained references to the subversive activities of Cuba, but did not mention such activities directed against Cuba. Everybody was aware that the U.S. was committing subversive acts against Cuba, while the U.S. draft was silent on that score. Castro insisted--and the Soviet Union fully agreed--that if such a reference was made, it had to apply to all parties. The provision should state that

"no party" would engage in subversion, and only then would it be acceptable. Otherwise it was contrary to the norms of international law. This was reflected in the Soviet draft protocol, and now the U. S. was departing from it.

The provision on inspection consisted of two parts, Mr. Mikoyan went on. The first, dealing with the dismantling of bases, removal of missiles and IL-18's, was simply a historical reference. The second, however, dealt with arrangements for the future, and there was a certain justification for bringing it up, since the Soviet Union had given assurances that weapons would not be re-introduced. The point, however, was also presented in the U. S. draft in a one-sided way--from the standpoint of U.S. interests alone. The Cubans also had a right to inspection, and the United States seemed not to comprehend this.

In this respect, the Soviet Union supported the reasonable proposal of Castro: Multilateral control based on equality of all parties by an international UN team of observers under the Security Council, which would verify the compliance with the declarations made to the Security Council and the Council's decisions.

Inspection of United States territory would apply only to certain Southern areas where counter-revolutionary gangs were concentrated and to Puerto Rico where there was a concentration of military forces. On the other hand, there would be inspection of the entire territory of Cuba and of other Caribbean areas. This was reasonable, and it was difficult to understand why the United States was opposed to such an arrangement.

Bilateral control, Mr. Mikoyan stressed again, was impossible. Whatever the U. S. might think of Cuba, he said, he respected the Cubans for the fact that they would never agree to such a provision.

As regards Castro's 5 points, Mr. Mikoyan further stated, he failed to understand what was objectionable about them, aside from the fact that Castro's name was attached to them. But names aside, his proposal as expressed in the November 26 message to U Thant was perfectly reasonable, and it was hard to understand what could be objected to.

Mr. Mikoyan cited the first point, and stated that the United States wished to allow itself the right of economic blockade and the right to exert pressures upon others to participate in such a blockade. If the United States did not wish to trade with some country--as it did not trade with the Soviet Union--it was the business of the United States, and the Soviet Union could not care less. Perhaps for Cuba, since it was more interested in U.S. trade, it was more important, but still if the United States wished to be unreasonable, it was purely its own affairs. But how could you claim the international right to exert pressures upon other countries? Did the United States really intend to continue this policy after the crisis was resolved? Mr. Mikoyan said he could just picture how Ambassador Stevenson would blush and squirm if he had to defend this position for the United Nations.

Castro's second demand was in accord with the elementary norms of international law, and its legitimacy was undeniable. It was in fact based on the implications of the understanding reached in the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters.

As for the third point, Mr. Mikoyan said he failed to believe that such a great world power as the United States could claim the right to piratical assaults, particularly in the Twentieth Century -- the age of the existence of the United Nations. Even as far back as the Middle Ages there were already some powers who fought piracy. And now the United States wanted to reserve the right to launch piratical and attacks from ships firing on peaceful hotels in Havana? In fact, the participants of that affair were written up in the American press as heroes.

The fourth point was essentially a reiteration of the United Nations Charter, and it was impossible to object to it. It was not any aggressive action on the part of Castro, but a legitimate claim.

The fifth demand made by Cuba was a legal demand and the Soviet Union fully supported it. The Soviet Union, however, appreciated the fact that it was difficult for the United States to accept it, and in order to meet this position, it worked out with Cuba a more flexible arrangement on this point. The Soviet draft Protocol merely called for entering into negotiations with Cuba about a future date for the removal of the Guantanamo base. From the standpoint of international law it was perfectly reasonable to call for negotiations. It was, of course, Cuba's business, and not that of the Soviet Union, but the latter supported this demand in accordance with international law and as a member of the United Nations. After all, who was there in that area that the United States wanted to defend itself from? The policy of maintaining that base was an anachronism, and if the United States was sincere in not having aggressive intentions, it would only gain in the eyes of the world in going along with this demand.

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The Soviet draft, Mr. Mikoyan continued, contained a provision for future negotiations on unsettled questions. If the United States was not yet prepared to finalize the normalization of economic and diplomatic relations with Cuba, why not state that it was prepared to negotiate on unsettled issues, rather than resolve them by means of ultimatums.


In the U.S. draft declaration the wording dealing with the requirements for the withdrawal and non-reintroduction of weapons was not quite right, but this, Mr. Mikoyan felt, could be easily resolved on a working level.

The reference to the Rio Pact in the US draft was irrelevant. This Pact had nothing to do with the U.S. and was purely the business of the United States. Its commitments were unknown, and references to it uncalled for.

Further, the non-invasion pledge as expressed in the U. S. draft declaration represented a deviation from the agreement reached in the letters exchanged between the heads of state. The conditions and reservations placed on it in the draft declaration practically voided it. Also, the President used the word "restrains" others from aggression, if Mr. Mikoyan understood correctly, whereas the draft declaration merely expressed the "hope" that others would not commit aggression, and even this reference was in the introductory part of the declaration and was in essence missing in the operative part. All this represented a retreat from the understanding reached in the exchange of letters.

Lastly, Mr. Mikoyan said that their feeling was that once the texts of the declarations were mutually agreed they should be presented to the Security Council for approval, since Cuba was on its agenda. Many of the countries there felt that this item should be taken up immediately after the election of the Secretary General. Mr. Mikoyan said he would suggest to U Thant that

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
the declarations be worked out with his assistance and agreed upon before presenting them to the Security Council -- for approval only, in order to avoid further fights in the Council. A decision of the Security Council should also be drafted, and the Soviet representatives would present their draft as soon as they could prepare one. The U.S. representatives should also make such a draft and submit it to the Soviet side.

In conclusion, Mr. Mikoyan said that the details of all these issues could be taken up further in working session, but these were the main considerations that he wanted to bring up at present.

Ambassador Stevenson said he wished to respond to Mr. Mikoyan's remarks briefly, and then ask his colleagues if they had any further comments. He expressed assurances that in spite of the delay in presenting the U.S. draft declaration, the United States was at least as anxious as the Soviet Union to settle the issues as speedily and amicably as possible, since this was in the interests of everybody concerned.

He expressed satisfaction that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept the form of declarations, and the hope that now that the U.S. draft was in the hands of the Soviet representatives, the Soviet draft would in turn be forthcoming soon. This would help to iron out in a final way those points on which agreement existed, and isolate those which were still disagreed.

As it appeared from Mr. Mikoyan's remarks, the two principal issues that were outstanding were (1) non-invasion of Cuba and (2) Castro's five points.



It had been repeatedly pointed out by U.S. negotiators that their interpretation of the agreement reached was that suitable safeguards were to be provided that weapons would not be re-introduced into Cuba, and that there would be effective inspection arrangements by UN observers, as stated in President Kennedy's letter. There had been no objection to this from Chairman Khrushchev. But since observation by the United Nations in Cuba proved impossible to achieve, the United States stated with all honesty that it had to carry out control by its own means. The U.S. did not ask the Soviet Union to agree to unilateral control, but the fact remained that until other arrangements were worked out, we had no other choice. The fact that the Soviet Union was anxious to comply was appreciated, and in view of that the United States has also gone a long way towards eliminating the crisis in lifting the quarantine although adequate inspection arrangements which had been raised as a condition were not implemented.

Further, the United States not only stated that it would not invade Cuba, but also that it would not support such an invasion by others.

In short, we did declare noninvasion although no appropriate safeguards had yet been established. And we did raise the quarantine in spite of the fact that inspection arrangements have not yet been worked out.

Referring to the five points of Castro, Ambassador Stevenson pointed out that they had been discussed before at length. They were not covered by the existing agreement, and the United States was not in a position to consider them. If new matters kept being introduced into the issue, it was doubtful that a solution could ever be found. Ambassador Stevenson continued that he understood that the Soviet Union had to support Cuban demands. On the other hand, the United States had the problem of considering the demands

of other Latin American countries, which the Soviet Union should take into account. We could only repeat that we were looking forward hopefully and anxiously to the time when relations with Latin American countries would be normalized, and this included Cuba.

With respect to the Rio Pact, Ambassador Stevenson pointed out that in stating that the Pact was not related to the U.S. Mr. Mikoyan overlooked the fact that the entire Chapter 8 of the U.N. Charter dealt with regional arrangements of which Rio Pact was one. He recalled to Mr. Mikoyan the debates on regional arrangements that took place in San Francisco at the time the Charter was being drafted, and Chapter 8 was the result of those discussions.

Further, Ambassador Stevenson expressed surprise that Mr. Mikoyan claimed United States omitted in its draft declaration the promise to restrain others countries from committing aggression. He pointed out there was no retreat ⁱⁿ from the initial position, since the October 27 letter the President said he was "confident" that other Latin American countries would "do likewise," and this position was reflected in the draft declaration. To Mr. Mikoyan's interjection that this was only in the introductory part of the draft, Ambassador Stevenson pointed out that this was only a statement of opinion and not a guarantee. However, he said we would be prepared to consider any new wording if that was a question of language.

Finally, Ambassador Stevenson said if he had understood Mr. Mikoyan correctly, the Soviet Union agreed that the settlement would be made in the form of declarations presented to the Secretary General for the information of the Security Council. In answer to Mr. Zarin's query whether this meant that there would be no decision by the Security Council itself, Ambassador Stevenson said that he was not convinced such a decision would be necessary since

a new debate on the issue in the Security Council could only lead to more mutual recriminations and would serve no purpose.

Mr. Mikoyan said it would be better to have a decision of the Security Council, since the Cuban question was on its agenda. But he reiterated that he was also anxious to avoid more wrangles on the Council floor and that all outstanding matters should be settled in advance.

Mr. McElroy said that Ambassador Stevenson had already covered all the points, but he wished to elaborate on some. The main objective with respect to the Cuban question ^{was} now ~~to~~ settle the issue as speedily as possible. Now that the most crucial points had been resolved, it would make a bad impression, both in the United States and probably in the Soviet Union if we proceeded to engage in a long haggle over mere semantics. The prolongation of the conflict would cause uneasiness all over the world. Therefore, we should dispose of those questions we were already faced with and not introduce new considerations. Otherwise, we would only be prolonging the discussions and defeating our own purpose.

It was deplorable that Mr. Mikoyan had said that the Soviet side was fulfilling its obligations while we were not, for the record of the case clearly showed that both sides have tried to contribute to resolving the ~~issue~~. In the efforts to achieve a settlement the United States had already demobilized its troops, stopped military preparations and relaxed military readiness conditions -- as one could read in any paper.

Furthermore, it had raised the quarantine even though there had not yet been an exchange of documents stipulating that the conditions raised as a requirement for lifting the quarantine had been met. Also, as

Ambassador Stevenson already mentioned, the U. S. draft declaration

stated that the United States would "not support" aggression by other countries, even though this had not even been included in the President's letter.

This meant going a long way towards trying to reach a settlement. If the United States pledged not to invade Cuba and pledged not to support those who might want to do so, others would not invade. All this demonstrated the spirit in which the United States was trying to resolve the issue and we should proceed in that spirit to reach a final settlement.

If the United States was retreating, as Mr. Mikoyan had indicated, then it was a "retreat" in the right direction. It should be borne in mind that we had gone a long way in fulfilling our obligations without waiting for the conditions to be met.

At the same time, it should be noted with satisfaction that the Soviet Union implemented the removal of missiles so promptly. True, no on-site inspection had been possible, but a device had been worked out for inspection at sea. Perhaps something similar could be worked out for the bombers.

With respect to Castro's five points Mr. McClellan said Ambassador Stevenson had already covered them. He would only mention that it would be a waste of time to begin wrangling about these new demands. The United States was not prepared to agree to the demand that there be no subversion. There was no organized subversion on the part of the United States, whereas in Cuba there were training camps and military preparations, to which in fact the Soviet Union rendered support. Therefore, in order to avoid unnecessary wrangling on this score it was better to drop this provision once and for all.

As for normalizing relations in the Caribbean, this could not be done by mere words. Only concrete events could accomplish such a normalization. If Castro maintained the kind of system that would not present a threat to ~~others~~ others, the problem would never even arise. We would even help, as we had in the past. Thanks to U.S. aid and investments, the standard of living in Cuba had been the highest of any country in the Caribbean. Even when Castro came to power, we had at first been sympathetic, until all U.S. property was arbitrarily confiscated by Castro, and even used by the Soviet military for the very subversive purposes that were just mentioned. This was the situation that accounted for the economic measures that the U. S. had taken. There was no sense in wasting time by bringing this point into the issue at hand.

It was just as futile to introduce the provision for mutual inspection. ~~There were~~ ^{were} no more training camps for mercenaries in the United States. As for Puerto Rico, there were military installations there--not training camps. To demand an inspection of them would be equivalent to an inspection of USSR territory to verify that no missiles were being built. Recalling Mr. Khrushchev's attitude to inspection of USSR territory, one could easily imagine what the Soviet reaction would be to such a suggestion!

Referring to U.S. overflights of Cuban territory, Mr. McCloy said that he understood that the Soviet Union supported Cuba on its stand in this regard. However, the problem we faced was that in the past there had been assurances given that no weapons were being introduced into Cuba, and it was only by means of overflights that these assurances had been proven unreliable. In other words, the security of the entire continent had depended on this one means of verification, and the Hemisphere would be terrified if this last method of assurance were given up. Perhaps it would be possible to find some language that would be acceptable, but the fact remained, that this was the only means available to us to reassure ourselves, and it could not be given up if the United States and other Western Hemisphere countries were to have confidence that their security was not threatened.

Mr. McCloy further pointed out that the overflights had begun only after suspicion had arisen, and would presumably be discontinued once suspicions were dispelled. It would be unrealistic on the part of the United States to stop them now, before confidence was restored.

There was no objection, Mr. McCloy said, to statements presented to the Security Council, and expressed the hope that an agreed decision of the Council could be reached. It was desirable, however, to avoid any more wrangles there. The best and simplest solution would be an agreed draft, but if that could not be found some procedure should be devised to avoid further wrangles.

A record of compromise was already established in striving for the solution of this case, Mr. McCloy continued, and efforts should be made not to spoil it. The main thing was facts, not words. And it was a fact that the United States did not wish to invade Cuba. The world was now anxious to see the ultimate liquidation of the crisis promptly.

With respect to the U. S. draft declaration he remarked that the reference to U Thant in the first paragraph could be deleted since it was only a quote.

As for the Rio Pact, Mr. McCloy pointed out that the reference to it was justified not only because the Rio Pact was a regional arrangement in accord with the UN Charter, but also because it pertained to the security of the American continent and therefore any new document dealing with the same subject had to allow reference to it. Otherwise, if no reference were made, it could be construed as an amendment to the Pact, which according to the Constitution would have to be ratified.

Mr. Mikoyan expressed satisfaction that the United States wished to settle the case promptly. He stressed he did not mean to minimize the results already attained, remarking that the obligations undertaken by the President were being fulfilled "not badly", and that this gave confidence for success in solving the matter finally.

He also noted with satisfaction that his suggestions to present agreed declarations to the Security Council met with no objection, and reiterated the desire of the Soviet side to avoid wrangles in the Council.

The Soviet draft declaration, he stated, would be forthcoming soon, but its content would be essentially the same as the draft protocol.

Today's exchange of views, he continued, would serve as a basis for further substantive discussions at subsequent meetings--point by point. At present, he would ^{not} wish to dwell further on individual outstanding points. They would be resolved on a working level.

He stressed that the worst feature of the U. S. draft declaration was the conditions placed on the non-invasion pledge, since it would make non-invasion dependent upon arbitrary judgment by the United States.

As for the requirement of inspection, in principle, this was a legitimate point, Mr. Mikoyan continued. In this regard, U Thant's proposal was very good, where a United Nations observers' group would proceed to a given area to be inspected upon request from the states concerned. He repeated that in Puerto Rico only those areas would be subject to inspection where counter-revolutionaries and mercenaries were being trained by the United States, not those areas where military installations were located. The Soviet Union, he indicated, would not tolerate an inspection of its military bases either. Given such reciprocal inspection arrangements, the United States would be satisfied that no weapons were being re-introduced into Cuba; while the Cubans would be reassured that others' obligations were being fulfilled as well.

Regarding Khrushchev's five points Mr. Mikoyan stated that Ambassador Stevenson in discussing them circumvented the real issue involved. He referred to Ambassador Stevenson's statement that while the Soviet Union had obligations to Cuba, the United States had obligations to other Latin American countries, interpreting this as meaning that the United States

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objected to the five points because other Latin American countries were not prepared to accept them. In this connection, he pointed out that if this were the only problem, the United States could bring its influence to bear upon them. This would correspond to the spirit of the exchange of letters. Moreover, the Latin American countries had no real ground for objections either, since Castro's proposals were in accord with the principles of international law.

As for negotiating with Cuba, since Mr. McCloy had indicated that the United States was not ready to do so now, language might be found allowing the possibility to conduct negotiations on unsettled issues between the two countries in the future, including the issue of the Guantanamo base.

Regarding the reference to the Rio Pact, Mr. Mikoyan stated that the Soviet Union was not opposed to regional arrangements and was in fact party to such arrangements. But since the provisions of the settlement on Cuba--such as the non-invasion pledge--would not be contrary to the Rio Pact, why make reference to it? It would be just as inappropriate as referring to the Warsaw Pact. As for its adherence to the Rio Pact, that was United States' own affair, even though the Soviet Union did not recognize the Rio Pact.

Mr. Mikoyan opened his remarks by stating that the Soviet side was in a most favorable position today since it had the privilege of having its position stated by Mr. Mikoyan. He had stated the Soviet position very well, and that was a contribution to the common task of ironing out the outstanding issues towards the ultimate settlement of the problem. He continued that he would have an opportunity to elaborate upon the questions brought up by Mr. Mikoyan.

At present, he wished to call upon the United States to study carefully the arguments that Mr. Mikoyan had presented.

He expressed agreement with Mr. McCloy that a great deal has already been done toward solving the crisis. President Kennedy, he continued, has shown great statesmanship in the first days of the crisis and had demonstrated that the two countries were able to reach agreement when they wanted to. At the same time, he stressed that Chairman Khrushchev's approach had been instrumental in averting the threat of war that had already been imminent. The parties should proceed in the spirit of the understanding that has already been achieved. This would demonstrate to the world that the two countries were able to solve this problem, and open the door to solving others in the cause of peace.

Ambassador Stevenson said the United States representatives were proud to have Mr. Mikoyan attend the meeting and have the opportunity to exchange views with him. Such an exchange had a bearing on the development of future relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and we were anxious to improve them.

He reiterated the U. S. desire to avoid further wrangles in the Security Council on the subject of the documents settling the Cuban issue.

In regard to reciprocal inspection, he referred to Mr. Mikoyan's appeal that the United States should not be stubborn, and expressed the hope that both sides would not be stubborn in trying to find a solution to such a vital matter. However, the provision for mutual inspection had not been a part of the initial agreement. Moreover, it would be equivalent to demanding inspection of Soviet territory as well. The provision as it now

stead, he pointed out, involved only inspection of Cuba and of United States territory, with no reference to the territory of the Soviet Union.

Referring to Castro's five points, he said that it was not a question of bowing to the desires of other Latin American countries. The United States he objected to their introduction on principle. They were not contained in the initial agreement, the United States was opposed to them, and if we introduced them as a new consideration, it would only complicate the solution of the problem. We should keep matters simple. In mentioning US support of Latin American countries, Ambassador Stevenson pointed out that we had only wished to emphasize that while we understood that the Soviet Union had to support Cuba, we did not put forward the consideration of our having to support other Latin American countries in our desire not to complicate matters. As for influencing others, if the Soviet Union had influence with Castro, it might persuade him to accept on-site inspection. To the last point, Mr. Mikoyan remarked that Castro did not have to be influenced; his November 26 statement indicated that he understood this point very well.

Referring to the Rio Pact Ambassador Stevenson again stressed that the United States had certain commitments under that Pact, which would not change even if it were not mentioned. He reiterated that reference to it was necessary for constitutional reasons, since this Pact was a part of the national law of the United States.

The United States, he stated further, appreciated the conciliatory

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attitude of the Soviet Union. But it should be stressed that the United States has also done a great deal in its attempt to achieve the elimination of the crisis. It accepted inspection at sea, as an alternative to the on-site inspection which had been put forward initially; it accepted the word of the Soviet Union on the number of missiles in Cuba; it abolished national emergency and military readiness conditions; it lifted the quarantine without waiting for the requirements to be fulfilled; it made a non-invasion pledge--the greatest single guarantee required of it; finally, it gave up the demand for UN observers in Cuba.

Mr. Mikoyan pointed out that inspection as proposed by U Thant, although not literally contained in the initial agreement, was implied in it and followed its spirit. Inspection of certain areas in the South of the United States was not equivalent to inspection of Soviet territory. But as a matter of fact, the Soviet Union was in favor of inspection of certain points--such as railroad stations and airports--as measures of prevent surprise attack, and this position had already been stated by Chairman Khrushchev. This in itself was a demonstration of the Soviet desire for the relaxation of international tension.

It expressed agreement that both sides had so far shown a spirit of cooperation and hoped this would continue.

Mr. McNamara stated that the United States objected to Castro's five points both in form and in substance. It would be a mistake to introduce them into the present transaction. If in the future the need arose to raise these matters, this could be done outside of the issue now under consideration.

He pointed out further that if indeed the Soviet draft declaration followed along the lines of the draft protocol, if it again brought up the five

points of Castro, there was little hope of arriving at agreed statements which both sides considered desirable. He urged the Soviet representatives to consider this matter carefully in that light.

As regarded inspection, he pointed out that if this issue were taken up in all the details that would arise, the matter at hand would take a very long time to resolve. Arrangements would have to be worked out for inspecting Soviet ports -- to verify that no missiles were being shipped out; measures involving inspection of United States territory; inspection of Cuba. This last point was particularly important, since it would not be Cuba's entire territory, but only selected parts. The problem would arise how to assure access by the United Nations to vital areas, where -- as reports went -- ^{even now.} there were hidden caches of armaments. The discussion as to what areas of the United States, in Cuba and the Soviet Union were to be open for inspection would lead to interminable debates.

The present task was to work ^{out} two brief statements as promptly as possible, before the atmosphere of cooperation and positive achievements was dissipated. This would then allow to proceed to the consideration of other important issues.

Mr. Khrushchev said the Soviet side would consider the comments of the United States carefully. The Soviet representatives could not agree with all U.S. statements, but they agreed that the settlement should be simple and reflect the agreement contained in the letters exchanged between the President and Mr. Khrushchev. He again stressed, that according to the Soviet interpretation, Castro's five demands reflected the spirit of that agreement.

The final document should include only what was contained in the Kennedy-Khrushchev letters. The U. S. draft declaration, however, introduced a new idea -- as Mr. Mikoyan had already pointed out. This could only prolong the deliberations. Soviet objections to the new reservations included in the U.S. draft were clear, and it was not necessary to repeat them.

On inspection, Mr. Kuznetsov said his understanding of the United States position was that the U. S. was willing to seek a solution that would be acceptable to all parties. At the same time, he stated that US insistence on its position with respect to overflights was tantamount to a regress to the beginning.